華盛頓——美中經濟與安全審查委員會在其最新年度報告中敦促國會啟動一項全面計劃，以確保美國能夠領先於中國在兩用 量子 技術和人工智慧領域的快速發展。
「誰在量子（和人工智慧）領域領先，誰就能控制數位經濟的加密；誰就能在材料、能源和醫學領域取得突破；誰就能在情報和目標定位方面獲得不對稱且可能持久的優勢，」該委員會今天向國會提交的 2025 年報告指出。
報告還補充說：“美國必須將量子技術視為一項至關重要的國家能力，而不是一個研究孤島，並採取相應的行動。”
該委員會的 2025 年報告發現，中國正在繼續「投入大量資源研發人工智慧和量子運算等具有軍民兩用目的的超視距技術，這些技術可能會加速中國軍事和情報能力的提升」。
因此，該組織建議立法者 establish by 2030 a “quantum first” goal to “focus on quantum computational advantage in three mission-critical domains—cryptography, drug discovery, and materials science.” The commission argues that the 2030 timeline “is essential to ensure the United States achieves quantum leadership before any adversary can leverage these capabilities against American interests.”
In tandem, Congress should provide “significant funding” for US quantum development, “focused on scalable quantum computing modalities, secure communications, and post-quantum cryptography,” as well as to new “workforce development” programs.
This includes the creation of a “Quantum Software Engineering Institute (QSEI) focused on developing the software foundations for scalable, secure, and interoperable quantum computing,” modeled on the National Artificial Intelligence Research Institutes and National Manufacturing Institutes. “[T]he QSEI would ensure that U.S. quantum hardware is matched by world-class software capabilities, enabling early operational advantage across science, industry, and defense,” the report says.
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The bipartisan US-China Commission was established by Congress in 2000 to “investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China,” according to the commission website.
Stronger Export Controls, Congressional Oversight
More broadly, the US-China Commission is calling for series of measures to substantially beef up US export controls on key technologies, such as semiconductors.
The report’s number one recommendation is that Congress mandate a new, interagency organization to “address the evolving national security challenges” being created by China’s “systematic and persistent evasion” of US export controls and sanctions.
This “unified economic statecraft entity” should at a minimum include: the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Office of Export Control Cooperation at the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Defense Department’s Defense Technology Security Administration, the report elaborates. Further, it should be tightly integrated with the Intelligence Community to allow “enhanced access to real-time intelligence on evasion networks.”
“[T]his is not something that we’d snap our fingers and all of a sudden have an entity ready to go in in trade negotiations with the current administration. It’s something that’s going to take time to implement and to integrate,” explained Commissioner Leland Miller, who is the CEO of the China Beige Book that provides data on the Chinese economy to companies and investors.
“The idea, though, is that the piecemeal approach to economic sanctions and to export controls has meant that there hasn’t been coordination. … [D]ifferent agencies have sort of prioritized and and operated separately,” he told reporters on Monday. “So, I think one of the reasons that we have pushed on this, and have elevated this to our top recommendation, is that there is a need at this point for these really important national security priorities to be put forward as more than a throw in in a trade negotiation.”
In addition, the commission urges lawmakers to strengthen the ability of BIS “to manage strategic competition with China in fast-moving technology sectors, such as leading-edge semiconductors used in artificial intelligence (AI) applications, and increase congressional oversight.”
This includes two key changes to US export controls on AI-enabling chips. First, Congress should direct BIS to change the “presumption of denial” for licenses to export to China those microchips now on Commerce’s export control list to a more stringent “policy of denial” — meaning that exports of certain chips would be barred if deemed potentially harmful to US national security.
The second change would call for Congress to force BIS to set up a system to “rent” rather than sell “advanced chips” by “mandating that any advanced chips above a certain threshold that are not designated as prohibited for export be accessible exclusively via the cloud.” Under the new system, exporters would be required as part of their licenses to vet their customers and report any “suspicious” activities.
Space
Over the past few years the commission has outsourced reports on China’s rapidly expanding space capabilities, and the new report doubles down on those concerns.
“China is pursuing an aggressive long-term, whole-of-government campaign to expand its space capabilities across military, commercial, and civil domains with the explicit intent of surpassing the United States. These rapid advances in space pose an escalating threat to U.S. national security, intensify U.S.-China strategic competition for international partnerships, and undermine the ability of U.S. commercial firms to compete internationally,” the report finds.
在軍事領域，該報告重點關註解放軍為「削弱、破壞或摧毀」美國衛星而發展反太空能力，這些衛星「構成」美軍指揮控製網路和目標定位系統的「骨幹」。委員會強調，過去十年，中國一直保持著「積極的」衛星發射計劃，用於自身軍事用途，並不斷加強對美軍（尤其是在印太地區的美軍）的監視能力，並在發生衝突時打擊美軍。
報告指出：“北京對反太空系統（包括直接上升式反衛星武器和共軌幹擾平台）的投資，表明其戰略是在衝突初期使美軍失去方向感和迷失方向。”
因此，委員會建議國會採取行動，“以維護和加強美國在關鍵太空領域的領先地位，因為中國正在軍事、商業和民用航太領域取得全面進展。”
這些措施包括「增加或重新分配」太空部隊的撥款，「使其達到必要的水平，以實現對太空的控制，並建立對中國快速發展的太空和反太空能力的太空優勢」。議員們也應「指示」國防部提升太空部隊的兵棋推演、建模、模擬和訓練能力。
此外，該報告敦促國會舉行監督聽證會，旨在「透過確定對尖端太空技術的投資，並評估中國的太空能力及其對美國太空工業基礎能力的威脅，來確保美國在太空領域保持主導地位」。
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